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Americans pride themselves on being modern, up to date,
progressive. They are widely known for their drive and energy in improving and perfecting things. Their world leadership in many fields is unquestioned. However, in one field,
we in the United States lag far behind our European contemporaries, and this is in the management of psychiatric
medico-legal procedures. This paper is written to point out
the current laws dealing with psychiatric problems in the various states of our nation, describing the laws covering similar
problems in various European countries and then to offer suggestions for improvements here.
Weihofen 4 * in 1933 cited the laws in the various Stites of
the United States, pointing out their defects and suggesting
reforms. Since that time a few reforms have been made in
some states but in general the suggested improvements have
met either with resistance or, what is more important, apathy.
As we see it, the chief defects in the laws dealing with these
problems in the United States are:
I. The "'Right and Wrong" Test-or "M'Naghten Rule."
2. Use of the hypothetical question.
3. Lack of qualifications of so-called "experts."
4. Expert witnesses are engaged by interested parties rather
than by the State.
According to Weihofen, the law in this country (except in
New Hampshire), can be summarized as follows: A person is
* Superior figures refer to bibliography at the end of this article.
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not criminally responsible for an offense if, at the time it is
committed, he is so mentally unsound as to lack:
(1) Knowledge that the act is wrong or
(2) (in 17 states) will power enough to resist the impulse
to commit it.
The first part of this rule states the so-called "right and
wrong" test. This is part of the law everywhere; and it is the
sole test of irresponsibility in England and in 29 American
states.
This right and wrong test is commonly known as the
"M'Naghten Rule." Daniel M'Naghten in 1843 had shot and
killed Drummond, private secretary to Sir Robert Peel, believing him to be Peel. M'Naghten labored under the delusion he was hounded by his enemies. He was found not
guilty on the ground of insanity but later, due to public indignation, a debate was held in the House of Lords and it was
determined to take the opinion of the judges on the law governing such cases and questions were submitted to fifteen
judges; fourteen of these judges decided on the right and
wrong rule. This rule is still in force in all English speaking countries, such as India, Africa, Australia (Brown,9 Ellery,' 7 Hasanat 2s and Parasuram57).
Queen Victoria was shot at in 1840 by a man named Oxford,
who also had been found "not guilty by reason of insanity."
The M'Naghten case occurred three years later and re-enforced public indignation; it also revealed strongly the fear of
regicide and led to the law which persisted -to date in England and in the United States.
The use of hypothetical questions in criminal cases is
another example of the archaic procedure still in force in this
country. In our opinion, its sole purpose is to confuse the expert, an attitude which is suggestive of the prejudice shown by
some lawyers toward physicians.
The laws in the United States embody the "all or none principle" and fail to take into consideration clinical conditions
such as epilepsy, psychopathic personality, high grade mental
deficiency, hypomania, etc. For example, we recently had in
Bellevue Hospital a mentally defective woman, with an I.Q.
of 65, who set several fires at a children's home where she
worked as a laundress. She had no family and claimed she
wanted to "get even with the world." According to New York
laws she was held completely responsible and we returned her
to court for trial. In New York, only mental defectives classified as idiots and imbeciles are held irresponsible.
At the present time in most of the United States, expert witnesses are not engaged by the state, but instead by the interested parties. This furnishes a realistic basis for lay people tc
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doubt the impartiality of the expert's testimony. Moreover,
in many states, the opposing lawyer has the right to question
the physician as to the amount of money he is receiving for
his testimony. This tends to influence the jury to believe
there is a close connection between the fee paid and the findings reported by the psychiatrist.
In most .states no standards have been set up for the qualifications of experts although some steps have been taken in New
York, Colorado, Rhode Island, Vermont, Wisconsin, California, Indiana, Ohio and Michigan.
As far back as September, 1937 the "Uniform Expert Testimony Act ' 6 2 was prepared and circulated by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws-an official body appointed by the respective states-in order to unify
as well as improve the standards of medical testimony. The
Act was approved by the American Bar Association on July
21, 1938.
According to the annual yearbook of the Commission on
Uniform State Laws the Act has been adopted and established
as law in the state of South Dakota and its substance has been
incorporated in the law of Vermont.
Since the publication of Weihofen's book some improvements have been made in the procedure of handling prisoners who are believed to be mentally sick. Apfelberg' read a
paper before this section in 1941 describing the procedure in
New York State. This procedure has been modified in 1943,
simplifying it greatly. (See Code of Criminal Procedure, New
York State, 1943.) Patterson5 2 in 1941 has described the appointment of a commission of qualified psychiatrists to exam44,
ine murderers and sex offenders in Michigan. Overholser

50

has written extensively about the Briggs Law, which has been
in operation in Massachusetts since 1921. According to this
law, all persons accused of first degree murder and all persons
indicted for a felony who have been previously convicted of a
felony or who have been indicted for other offenses more than
once, are reported at once to the Department of Mental Hygiene and this Department assigns two psychiatrists to examine the prisoner to determine his mental state. Overholser
(1939) described the passage of a law in Illinois in 1938 dealing with sexual psychopaths.
It is quite obvious that medico-legal procedure lags far behind the advancement of psychiatric knowledge. - What are
the psychological difficulties which prevent us from applying
our knowledge in this very important field?
In our opinion, these difficulties may be summarized as follows:
1. The legislator has to take into consideration the general pub-
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lie's demand for what it considers justice. He shares public
apprehension that psychiatrists tend to pamper or excuse the
criminal and help him to evade justice.
2. The public fears criminals and believes that very severe measures are necessary to protect society from the threat of criminality.
While both above-mentioned factors are conscious, the following two have their roots deep in the unconscious. They are:
3. Members of the social group fear their own criminal impulses
which they suppress and which the criminal openly expresses.
Thus, they both fear and envy him and therefore cannot refrain
from being vindictive. (A similarity may be seen in the aging
sexually frustrated female teacher who persecutes severely any
impulses of awakening sexuality in her pupils.)
4. The deeply inrooted primitive desire for retaliation makes the
social group look upon the criminal as an object of revenge.
The death penalty used in various states clearly demonstrates
this mechanism, as pointed out by Zilboorg, 68 , 69 Cushman14 and
other writers.
Each of the above enumerated factors has its special ramifications and each creates a source of resistance against any
serious medico-legal reform. All of these factors are largely
responsible for the general distrust toward the psychiatrist
dealing with the criminal. At times even the culprit himself
resents the psychiatrist and prefers to be labeled as a criminal
rather than being branded as "psychopathic" or "bug."
In view of such deeply rooted general resistances, our attitude should, of course, be very cautious. We cannot simply
disregard them as unimportant. Society and the legal profession have to be carefully educated to reach an understanding of the psychiatric viewpoint, which, we believe, is the most
rational approach toward these problems. We fully agree with
the opinion of Liszt 33 (the great classicist of European criminology, who was largely responsible for modernization of German criminal law and for the introduction of the so-called
"psychiatric criterion"), who said: "The legal conscience of
the people should be educated and not pushed aside by the
legislator."
In preparing this paper we believed that if we studied the
philosophies and practices of handling criminals in various
European centers, we could profit from their experiences. In
the early part of this century several conferences and discussions were held among prominent European lawyers and psychiatrists and, as a result, many important issues were clarified. Space will not permit us to present a complete review
of the European scene.
The classical concept of crime and punishment is based on
the fallacy of free will. In 1902 Bleuler 6 pointed out that it
is not possible to prove convincingly in most cases that the
criminal acted under an irresistible impulse and was incapa-
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ble of any oLher action. According to this principle, even a
psychotic individual might be held legally responsible for his
acts. On the other hand, even if we adhere to the theory of
complete determinism of action - and as psychiatrists, we
can hardly advocate the concept of free will - we still are confronted with the criminal action as a social threat, a dangerous
phenomenon. Let us remember in this connection that Spinoza in his introduction to the study of effects in Ethics proclaims his fully deterministic point of view. "The evil man,"
he says, "is as little responsible for his being evil as the snake
for his venom. However, we destroy the snake not because of
his free will but because of his danger." Obviously we do not
need the concept of free will in order to deal adequately with
the criminal.
The concept of reasonable planning is closely connected
with the "right and wrong" rule. According to Bleuler. 5 the
application of this rule as the sole criterion for criminal responsibility per se is proof of "an unforgiveable short-sightedness and of the absolute blindness toward human psychology
by which some legislators are afflicted."
Bleuler proposes instead the psychiatric criterion, based on
psychiatric knowledge and applied only by highly trained experts. Inasmuch as a mental disease brings something new
into the existence of the human being, so must his actions be
judged in an entirely different way. Following this principle
there is established the purely psychiatric concept of responsibility. Bleuler 6 in discussing the concept of guilt and responsibility in 1904, claimed that in our modern society the idea
of revenge (declared wrong by Christ) is superfluous, harmful and an unworthy remnant of old epochs that still connect
us with savages and animals. We should not inflict unnecessary suffering on any one.
When we accept this principle and discard the idea of guilt
and retaliation, we inevitably reach a point where our chief
aim will be the most adequate treatment of the criminal. As
in every practical science, this can be based only on the adequate study and understanding of the offender.
We become aware of the progress accomplished when we
compare various formulations of responsibility. We find psychological formulations based on the old concepts of scholastic psychology such, for instance, in "Codex juris canonici.
Delicti sunt incapaces qui actu carent usu rationis,"3 9 or, a similar formulation of the Austrian code: "There is no crime if
the culprit is completely deprived of the use of reason." In
some of the clinical biological formulations such as the French
and Belgian, the only prerequisite of irresponsibility is the
state of dementia. Practically speaking, this term may be ex-
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tended almost indefinitely and may include all sorts of mental disturbances. It is not surprising, therefore, that the eminent French legal psychiatrist, Rogues de Fursac, 2 2 finds it necessary to comment as follows: "One should not pronounce
irresponsibility except in cases when protection of society can
be assured by measures of medical order. One should not pronounce diminished responsibility except in cases when our indulgence would not have the effect of increasing the danger
of the individual."
Formulations which are modeled on the M'Naghten Rule
are found in various European codes and we shall refrain from
quoting and analyzing the often unessential modifications.
Since one of us (G.B.) has had personal experience with one
of the concepts, we would like to dwell on it at some length.
The Polish penal code of 193221 had disregarded the concept of guilt and introduced the principle that penal responsibility falls only on a person who commits an action forbidden
by law under menace of punishment. An intentional crime
is a crime which the criminal commits under the condition
that he "foresees the possibility of criminal consequence or
criminality of action itself and agrees to them."
In logical consequence of this formulation, article 17, paragraph one, states:
"A person should not be punished who at the time of the criminal action, because of mental retardation, mental sickness or other disturbance
of mental function, could not recognize the nature of his action nor
could he control his activity." -

Paragraph two of this article contains the limitation:
"Paragraph one does not hold in a case when the culprit puts himself
deliberately in such a mental condition as to be able to commit the

crime"

(such as the man who takes several drinks in order to get
enough courage to commit a robbery).
In analyzing these paragraphs, we become aware of the combination of biological and psychological criteria of irresponsibility. These paragraphs embrace various borderline cases as
well as outstanding pathological conditions. It is in the borderline cases that justice could not have been done according to
the classical legal codes. According to the classical school of
law, the expert is asked whether the mental condition of the
culprit was such as to warrant the existence of the evil intention or not. Inasmuch as this question of alternative character cannot be expressed in a fraction, the expert was expected
to answer only "Yes" or "No." Such an alternative is obviously
fallacious and artificial to the modern psychiatrist.
The Polish law always takes into consideration the much
disputed concept of diminished responsibility. It says: (Paragraph One) :
"If in the moment of committing a crime the faculty to recognize the
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nature of the action or to direct the activity was limited to a great extent, the court may apply an extraordinary mitigation of punishment."

Paragraph Two adds a limitation similar to the paragraph
of the preceding article:
"Paragraph One does not hold when the limitation of recognition was a
result of intoxication caused by the fault of the criminal."

Discussion of the problem of diminished responsibility in
European psychiatry is highly instructive and linked up with
the most decisive problem of criminology, that is, the treatment of the criminal. Let us recall here one of the principal
sources of resistance mentioned at the onset of our considerations, namely, the distrust of the psychiatrist and the suspicion
that his dealing with the criminal may help the prisoner to
evade justice. Thus, the development and proper status of
the concept of diminished responsibility was hampered by fear
that its sole result would be creating new difficulties for the
authorities and a new threat for society. It was feared that
some of the most dangerous criminals would benefit by escaping the punishing hand of justice and by being subjected to
the too lenient judgment of the psychiatrist.
It is not surprising that from the very onset the concept of
diminished responsibility was almost as strongly fought against
(Williams, 67 Luniewski3 4,5 and others) as it was advocated
33
2,
Bychowski,17, 12
(Bleuler,5. 6 Forel, Aschaffenburg, 3 Liszt,
etc.). A decisive reform was initiated in 1904-1905 by Liszt in
his project of the new German penal code. He counteracted
the general apprehension concerning the treatment of psychopathic criminals by emphasizing, that a person with diminished
responsibility does not deserve a mitigated punishment but instead rather a different treatment. Society has to be protected
in a more efficient way and this could be accomplished by collaboration of a special magistrate and the criminal judge.2 The
latter could order an immediate temporary imprisonment
whereas the former would have to remand the criminal to a
hospital.
Liszt proposed a rather elaborated classification of criminals
with diminished responsibility into the following groups:
1.

The individual is not dangerous to the public: He is given a milder
punishment.
2. The individual is dangerous to the public: He gets milder punishment and is also hospitalized.
a. He is able to stand punishment: he gets first his punishment, his
hospitalization being postponed.
b. He is unable to stand punishment. He begins by being hospitallized and gets his punishment afterwards.

It is interesting to note that this project in not liberating
even a severe psychopath satisfied the general public's de2 The special magistrate we refer to is linked up with the fact tha'
in certain European countries there are procedures as a result of whic7
a person is deprived of his civil rights and a guardian is appointed to

administer his affairs.
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mands for punishment. To this point of view, Bleuler objected with his characteristic ardor. Sarcastically, he contended that "public feeling" was "just falsified by lawyers and representatives of "religion of love." For the rest, he gave a high
praise to Liszt's project since it finally broke with the impossible principles of repentance.
"All its real points have the purpose of protecting society .

.

. Individ-

uals with diminished responsibility are sick, therefore, we treat them as
such. We protect society from them and we renounce the penitence.
They are sufficiently punished by constant hospitalization or supervision."

It might be pointed out that even Aristotle described criminals with tendency to recidivism and complained about the
lack of sufficient measures of prevention.
In Belgium, a country where particular attention has been
devoted to the subject, statistics reveal:
1. That no more than one third of prisoners are healthy of mind and

body and in control of their free will.

2. 90% of recidivists are classified as "degenerates," that is, psycho-

paths.

It seems logical that individuals with psychopathic features
are particularly compelled to repeat their illegal or anti-social
actions. On the other hand, penal practice shows, as pointed
out already by Liszt, that "every punishment is a contributing
factor toward criminality." As long as the criminal policy toward individuals with diminished responsibility remained uncertain and the intervention of the psychiatrist was supposed
simply to mean a mitigation if not an abolition of punishment, opposition rose, not only from the ranks of lawyers but
even from those of psychiatrists. Its main representative was
Willmans, 67 whose standard work on diminished responsibility
published in 1927, played a great role in the development of
medico-legal opinions. His point of view can be summarized
substantially as follows:
"The concept, itself, is too extensible, inexact, difficult to grasp and

likely to be misused by subjective interpretation on the part of psy-

chiatrists, judges and attorneys. The decision of responsibility and
irresponsibility would become even more difficult than hitherto. The

judge accustomed to the classic concept of the necessary relationship
between crime and punishment would consider that the individual with
less responsibility is less guilty and, as such, should get less punishment. From the educational and preventive point of view, this would
be entirely incorrect."

Another author, 37 calls it even "monstrous." The education of
the criminal cannot start with the declaration that he is less responsible than anybody else and on that basis receive a lesser
punishment.
However, aside from those more theoretical difficulties, Willmans raises the practical point which to him seems even more
harassing. Dangerous psychopaths could not be handled in
the existing psychiatric institutions since it would be detrimental to the institutions. Therefore, special institutions
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would have to be constructed. Previous to this, psychopathic
criminals were submitted to the usual prison regimen. The
hospitalization of the psychopathic criminal would meet with
various other social difficulties. In our opinion, despite his
great authority, Willmans was too cautious and some of his
objections proved to be groundless.
Finally, -the principle of diminished responsibility was recognized in such European countries as Belgium and Netherlands,
all Scandinavian countries, Switzerland, Yugoslavia, Austria
and Germany (before Hitler), Poland and Czechoslovakia.
What are the main principles of modern practice in dealing
with criminal psychopaths who have been recognized as such
by the existing criminal procedure? The further one withdraws from the classic law of guilt and repentance, the more
the practical point of view prevails. This practical point of
view has a double purpose: The best protection of society and
the most efficient treatment of the criminal. The pursuit of
the former purpose depends largely on an effective pursuit of
the latter. The most adequate treatment of the criminal, however, must be based, like any treatment, on a careful study of
his individuality. Only such a study can determine both the
prognosis and the choice of an appropriate method of treatment. This principle probably finds its most radical expression in the Russian code. The principle of the Soviet criminal
policy can be expressed as follows: "Use of the most effective
measures of social protection or of education of socially dangerous individuals."
We must ask what is the use of inflicting punishment on an
individual whose mental condition or personality is such that
this punishment will not change anything in his personality
and consequently in his criminal behavior? In such a case, we
should rather suggest hospitalization in an appropriate institution. If possible, this institution should use methods which
promise effective improvement of the criminal. On the other
hand, it may be that, despite his deficient personality, the criminal is likely to change under the impact of punishment; then
and then only, should punishment be applied.
From what we have said, it becomes apparent that the whole
procedure in use depends on two elements, hospitalization or
imprisonment. The interplay of those two main devices determines various methods in use in different countries. Let
us mention the Swiss and the Polish procedures as two specific
examples.
The Polish general code discusses in detail the means of prevention as applied to various categories of criminals. We quote
the main articles: Article 80: paragraph one
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"If the criminal has been recognized as possessing a diminished faculty
of discernment and of conducting his activity and his being at liberty
threatens the legal order, the court can order his internment in a psychiatric institution."

Paragraph two:
"If such a criminal were condemned to imprisonment, then the court
has to decide after he has been released from the prison whether he
should then be hospitalized."
Article 81:
"The duration of the stay in a psychiatric institution is not determined
beforehand. The court cannot order a release prior to one year."

Article 82: paragraph one.
"If the criminal action is connected with misuse of alcohol or other narcotics, the court can order that the criminal after having served the
penalty shculd be placed in a corresponding curative institution for the
duration of two years."

Paragraph two:
"An early release from the institution can be decided by the court."

The code discusses also the means of crime prevention in
cases of vagrants, recidivists, etc. The principle of education
and re-socialization through work is largely applied. It is quite
natural that the application of this principle requires not only
a large staff of psychiatrists and psychiatrically minded judges
and lawyers, but also an adequate number of appropriate institutions. Therefore, it is not surprising that the best reports
available come from small and socially minded progressive
countries which had the opportunity to organize their psychiatric penal work. For that reason, we should like to mendon Switzerland and Belgium.
A quite recent report by Manser3 6 deals with the experience
of the Department of Psychiatry at the University of Zurich
over the period of twenty-five years. Diminished responsibility was found in twenty-five per cent of all cases of criminals
examined by the psychiatrists. The principle of diminished
responsibility was found useful both from the point of view
of legal testimony and treatment. The psychiatrist does not
ask for an obligatory mitigation of punishment in all cases of
diminished responsibility. In connection with Switzerland it
is important to mention that the principle of open care, largely
developed in that country, plays an important role in the treatment of paroled criminal psychopaths.
Belgium is a small country but its contribution to the advancement of social problems is of great importance. The
Belgian criminal school headed by Verwaeck 3 has made an
extensive study of the psychopathic criminal, and made and
put into practice valuable suggestions and ideas. Every criminal is subject to psychiatric examination. Moreover, psychiatrists and anthropologists are on the staff of most prisons.
The principle of individualization is thus applied from the
very onset and continued throughout the whole treatment so
that the handling of the criminal becomes a treatment in its
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real medical sense. This, of course, is possible only on a basis
of penal repression backed, not by the idea of presumed moral
guilt, but on the potential danger toward society. If the criminal is considered abnormal, he may, but need not be, hospitalized by the court. The hospitalization does not necessarily
preclude eventual imprisonment. Both hospitalization and
imprisonment are for an indeterminate period. They can be
prolonged or shortened according to the progress made by the
psychopathic criminal. The hospitalization is pronounced by
a commission of social defense consisting of a magistrate, an attorney, and a psychiatrist. The hospitalization by this commission is not a punishment. Its maximal term can vary from
between five to fifteen years according to the gravity of the offense. However, and this seems very important, the criminal
so interned may request his liberation every six months. This
request may be granted according to the progress he has made
in the meantime. The liberation on parole is subject to both
psychiatric and social contact. Thus, it can be invalidated if
the hospitalized individual proves not to be socially cured and
remains socially dangerous.
Naturally, a procedure thus constituted requires for its efficient functioning a system of social organization taking care of
the liberated prisoner. There are committees of patronage
and offices of social readaptation. Thus, the criminal is an object of legal, social and psychiatric care from the very onset of
his "career" throughout all the stages of his eventual social
rehabilitation. Principles of this system as expounded by Verwaeck have been generally adopted by the International Convention of Criminologists, London, 1925.
It seems pertinent to illustrate our discussion by a few clinical examples. The individual study, not only of the criminal,
but also of the intrinsic mechanism of his criminal action should
determine the prognosis (both mental and social) and the
treatment. Careful psychiatric examination, enriched if possible by psychoanalytic approach (a psychoanalytic study of
some cases at least may be considered as a difficult yet highly
desirable ideal), will determine a few types in which a classic
punishment will be not only ineffective, but even detrimental both to the individual and to society.
We need not expound on such obviously clinical examples
as an early slowly progressing schizophrenic process. We know
very well that anti-social change of behavior may for years precede any other manifest striking clinical symptoms. Therefore,
only an experienced clinician will be able to diagnose the case
on time and spare both the individual and society a needless
trial, detention, prison psychosis, etc.
What is much less obvious is the type of criminal described
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by Freud" as the so-called criminal because of feeling of guilt.
Unconsciously he is craving for punishment and he deliberately breaks laws in order to be punished. He therefore is
doomed to repeat his crimes indefinitely since the need for
punishment is appeased only temporarily and the criminal constantly seeks new punishment. Merely punishing him would
be just as meaningless as punishing a child who is naughty
because it wants to provoke the adults. It is obvious that such
an individual should benefit from the principle of diminished
responsibility. His conscious ego plays a minimal part in-his
offense. Thus, not only can he not be considered as fully responsible but also it is obvious that punishment would not produce any decided change in his psychic economy and, accordingly, in his behavior.
The same holds true for any deeply neurotic criminal whose
transgressions of law have a character of compulsion and therefore are likely to repeat themselves indefinitely. We would not
derive any benefit, for instance, from imprisoning an epileptoid arsonist or a compulsory kleptomaniac. Thus, in such
cases, only a careful study will allow us to outline an individual treatment. Hospitalization combined with psychotherapy
and occupational therapy may prove efficient. In other cases,
however, our observation and tentative therapy may convince
us that there may be such an amount of aggressive asocial
drives that their sublimation (or education) proves to be impossible in the present state of our knowledge. Now, in such
cases, even if we agree to diminished responsibility our concern for social security will determine the application of hospitalization under conditions which would allow as much rehabilitation as possible.
Occupational therapy seems to offer here the greatest chances,
as shown in particular by the famous colonies for criminals in
Russia.
Let us take up now the type of psychopathic criminal with
abnormally undeveloped superego, so-called "moral insanity"
or "social agnosia." Whatever our theoretic approach may be,
practically we know that simply by declaring him irresponsible
or less responsible and mitigating his punishment, we shall not
achieve any social benefit. Therefore, in each case, we have to
determine what the chances may be for social rehabilitation by
the combined use of reeducation and penal intimidation. We
know that some of those individuals, even if they are seemingly unable to acquire a real superego, are likely to benefit
from training. Consequently, they may change their behavior
as a result of sheer knowledge and unpleasant experience just
as a child of Watson experiments learns to avoid the burning
candle.
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Finally, and this shall be our last example, let us consider
the so-called "accidental" criminal. We may study his personality and the crime in question and determine that he had
acted with a pathological effect. In this offense, his conscious
ego was overwhelmed by the flow of emotions originating in
the unconscious. We, therefore, may consider him as irresponsible or less responsible, and, since the conditions which have
resulted in his offense were exceptional and are not likely to
repeat themselves, we may not impose on him either a prolonged imprisonment or hospitalization. The detention may
appear rather as a symbolic expiation more for the benefit of
the social sense of justice than for the real benefit of society.
On the other hand, our individual study may show us that
the mental condition and psychological mechanism of the
crime are such that it is likely to repeat itself as for instance, in
the case of an epileptoid individual with alcoholic tendencies.
In such cases, a prolonged hospitalization with supervision
after liberation or parole may prove necessary.
We offer here case records of two women prisoners seen at
Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital. According to the existing laws
in New York, both of these women were considered by the
court to be "legally sane" and "able to stand trial" although
in our opinion both were such severe deviates that they should
be in a hospital rather than in a prison.
Case One

A white, unmarried Italian Catholic female, age 20, was committed to the hospital from the court of General Sessions after conviction of Second Degree Larceny. She had stolen a fur coat from
a department store. In court she had dismissed her attorney,
pleaded her own case. During the trial it was reported she had
burnt newspapers in her cell "to drive out evil spirits." After conviction she became agitated and said to the judge: "You'll get your
just deserts in Hell." Mental observation was ordered.
According to the court records she had been arrested for grand
larceny three years earlier under another name, and after conviction was given three years probation. She was arrested again
eighteen months later under another name, convicted of Petit Larceny in the Court of Special Sessions and committed to the House
of Good Shepherd.
She had three previous admissions to Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital. Four years before she was sent to us from one of the Magistrates Courts charged with stealing a fur jacket in a department
store. At that time she gave many false statements about herself,
said she was away from her home in Cleveland, that her father was
dead, that she was an only child. We later learned that she had
never lived away from New York, that both parents were alive, that
she was one of seven children, and that for years she had had difficulty in school, community and home. We reported to the court
she was an individual of psychopathic personality but legally sane.
She was again committed to Bellevue three years later charged with
Petit Larceny. At that time we reported to the court she was emo-
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tionally unstable, that she had suicidal impulses at times but that
according to the New York laws she was legally sane. Following
her conviction on this charge she was committed to the House of
Good Shepherd. The authorities there returned her to Bellevue
six months later with a statement she had not adjusted well, that
she was seclusive, uncooperative. She was again discharged from
Bellevue with the diagnosis of "Psychopathic Personality, without
psychosis."
The family history was said to be negative. Physical examination and laboratory studies were normal. The mother and one sister described the patient as a person who was always seclusive, irritable, emotionally unstable. The patient admitted that since she
was five years of age she quarrelled frequently, destroyed property
when angry, stole money from relatives and others.
During her last period of observation she showed fluctuations in
her mood and behavior. At times she was friendly and cooperative,
at other times she was sullen, irritable, sarcastic. She stated she
felt harassed by evil spirits and that she wore a cross and set fires
to ward off this danger. She said she kept a knife under her pillow at home and set fires at home as well as in jail to drive out evil
spirits. We were unable to elicit any definite hallucinations or any
other content of delusional nature. She mixed well with other patients during her hospital stay. Psychometric tests indicated she
was of low average intelligence with an I.Q. on the Bellevue-Wechsler test of 88.
It was the opinion of some of our staff that she was an early
Schizophrenic while others felt she was a Schizoid Psychopath. Our
report to the court stated that according to the current law she was
"not in such a state of insanity as to be incapable of understanding
the nature of the charges against her or the proceedings or to advise with attorneys in her own defense" and she was returned to
court to have sentence pronounced.
Case Two
A white female, age sixteen, Catholic, Irish descent, waitress,
was committed to Bellevue Hospital from the Court of General Sessions charged with Burglary and Grand Larceny. This patient has
had two previous admissions to Bellevue Psychiatric Hospital. She
was sent to us at the age of thirteen from the Children's Court. At
that time we learned that she had been running away from home,
had been committed by the Children's Court to a correctional institution. She adjusted poorly in the reformatory and was sent home;
she ran away from home, was found, taken to Children's Court and
sent to Bellevue. She was diagnosed in Bellevue at that time as
being a behavior problem and, on her return to court, we recommended that she be sent to a correctional institution again.
Two years later she was sent to the prison ward of Bellevue
Hospital from the Felony Court; she was charged with robbery.
She was in the Felony Court as she had stated she was twenty-three
years old. When we discovered her real age to be fifteen, we returned her to the Felony Court. We reported that she was a severe
behavior problem but that she was not legally insane. One year
later she was sent to us from the Court of General Sessions. She
stated that on her return to the Felony Court one year earlier she
had been committed to a training school for girls and had escaped
from that institution.
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In describing her family history, the patient claimed that she has
had difficulty with her father since early childhood, that he was
very cruel to her, that she has not spoken to him since she was ten
years of age. She stated that one of her older brothers sexually
assaulted her when she was a child. When she was in Children's
Court two years earlier she claimed that both of her parents were
alcoholics and that they both were very cruel to her. When she
came to Bellevue she denied these accusations, but said that she
had told lies about her parents because she wished that they would
be punished.
We interviewed both parents and they stated that they are unwilling to take the girl home and felt that she should take the full
responsibility for her acts; the father stated that he did not wish
to see her again because of the difficulties she has brought on the
family. They denied that any other members of the family had
shown mental symptoms or delinquency.
The mother stated that the patient told her repeatedly she would
return home and cease her antisocial conduct if the mother would no
longer live with her husband.
The patient stated she had a skull fracture at the age of two and
she had frequent headaches. Skull X-rays, electro-encephalogram
studies (studies of electric phenomena that accompany brain action)
and neurological examinations were negative. The parents refused
to give permission for a pneumo-encephalogram (a procedure that
involves injection of air into the brain after withdrawal of spinal
fluid by puncture). A report was received from the hospital where
she was sent at the time of her accident and it indicated she did not
have a skull fracture and she had been released within a few hours.
According to the information supplied us from the court and
from the patient's parents, the girl had shown marked emotional
instability since very early childhood. The patient herself stated
that when she was angry she would break dishes and furniture and
would assault others. She gave a history of other delinquencies,
including stealing, running away and sexual promiscuity for many
years.
During the patient's third period of observation in Bellevue she
showed fluctuations in her mood and behavior. At times she was
friendly and cooperative, while at other times she was sullen, quarrelsome, defiant and threatening. She quarreled with matrons and
with patients and on one occasion when smoking privileges were
taken away from her because of her behavior she broke dishes and
threatened to kill the matron.
The patient talked very freely about her sexual delinquencies
and antisocial activities. She stated that she has been one of the
group of people who preyed on service men. She and other girls
lured these men up into Harlem and then the colored men who
worked with her would rob the victims at the points of knives or
loaded guns. She stated that frequently she carried a loaded gun
and a knife but denied that she has ever shot at or stabbed any one.
She stated that after she ran away from a reformatory she married
a colored man because she heard that he had some property; she
said she expected that he would be drafted and she hoped in this
way to get control of his property. She stated that her husband
was sent to Federal Prison because of failing to report to his draft
board. The patient said that she had been having sex relations
with both white and colored men but preferred colored men be-
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cause they were more friendly to her. She said she served a prison
sentence in another state a year earlier after she escaped from a
training school. She said she preferred using guns rather than
knives when she assisted in robberies as she didn't think she would
shoot anyone but felt she might easily stab any one who was silly
enough to resist robbery.
At no time during the patient's stay in the hospital were we able
to elicit from her any definite evidence of delusions, hallucinations,
ideas of influence, reference or persecution or suicidal tendencies.
This patient was reported to be psychopathic but legally sane and
was returned to court to face the charges against her. In this case,
too, we believe this girl to be mentally abnormal and more suitable
for hospitalization than imprisonment.
Suggestions for Reform
Reforms from several sources are indicated. The present
laws dealing with the "right" and "wrong" rule and the "irresistible impulse" should, in our opinion, be abolished. The
present concept of legal versus medical insanity should be discarded; this concept is as archaic as would be the use of kerosene lamps in the Waldorf Astoria Hotel in 1944. The laws
should take into consideration the concept of diminished responsibility and not hold psychopaths, epileptics, some alcoholics, morons, and mildly psychotic persons completely responsible for their acts. We are not advocating the "coddling"
of criminals but feel that such persons listed above, when convicted of crimes, should be sent to special hospitals for treatment. Each case should be decided on its own merits.
We believe that the "Uniform Expert Testimony Act" should
be publicized more widely and reintroduced into various state
legislatures with the backing of local and national psychiatric
societies. We believe that all persons to be qualified to testify
as "experts" should be certified as experts in psychiatry by the
American Board of Psychiatry and Neurology.
We believe with Smith that the physician in the past has not
been given adequate opportunity on the witness stand to explain his position, his findings and the reasons for his opinions,
and we believe, not only that experts should be permitted to
speak freely and fully but that they should not be subjected
to the "hypothetical questions," still used in many states.
We would advocate that in medico-legal cases experts be
appointed by the court, as provided by the Act, rather than by
the interested parties, the expert acting in an advisory capacity
to the jury, judge and counsel. We would advocate that the
experts submit their reports in writing as is now done in New
York State. These recommendations, we realize, are not new
and have been advocated for over twenty years by many writers
including Weihofen, 4 H. W. Smith,58 E. M. Morgan, 42 Sheldon
Glueck, 27 J. S. Turner,6 1 Overholser, 44' 50 Kennedy,3 2 T.
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Crice,' 3 W. Nelson, 43 Bernard Glueck, 25 W. A. White, 65, 66 J. E.
Hughes,3' Jess Spirer, 60 J. P. Gilbert, 24 H. B. Brackin, 7 W. P.
4
Butler,10 and B. W. Black.
We believe that much of the present antagonism between
members of the legal and medical profession can be overcome
once each knows the contributions and the limitations of the
other. We would advocate that psychiatrists be appointed in
each law school to give courses on psychopathology. Wherever
it is possible we believe law students who are interested in
criminal law should be taken to the wards of psychopathic or
state hospitals and attend clinics where psychiatric cases can
be presented.
On May 8th, 1944, George H. Dession, Professor of Law in
Yale University, wrote in a personal communication to one of
us (F. J. C.), that at the Yale Law School there is a voluntary
course in which the law students have an opportunity to interview mental patients, but this course is normally taken by
only twenty-five to thirty students from the Law School.
In a follow-up letter on May 17th, 1944, Professor Dession
wrote:
"Since last writing you I have checked over my files on the other schools
and find that in 1941 we made a survey of the curriculum of seventynine law schools in this country, including all of the major ones. According to that survey, a course in legal psychiatry apparently rather
similar to our own was being given at the University of Iowa College of
Law. Three other schools, including Chicago and Minnesota, listed
courses in psychology."

We believe also that special courses in medico-legal psychiatry should be given to members of the judiciary - especially, of course, to judges of criminal courts. They should
not only be taught general psychopathology, mental mechanisms, etc., but should be taught about the role of the unconscious in criminal cases (Erickson' 8), the mechanisms of crime
and the prejudice they themselves have for or against a criminal because of their own unconscious mental mechanisms.
Freud in 1906 and later Jerome Frank 9 have pointed out the
need of such instruction. Moir 4' has advocated the establishment of professorships in criminology by leading universities.
Roche has advocated special training for physicians who are
interested in the field of forensic psychiatry. Recently Dr. S.
Bernard Words, the Director of the Division of Psychiatry at
Bellevue Hospital, has announced that a research project in
forensic psychiatry will soon be undertaken at the New York
University Medical School.
Conclusions
In this paper we have attempted to point out that at the
present time our handling of psychiatric problems in criminal
courts lags far behind our knowledge of psychiatry and also
lags far behind the procedures being followed in various Euro-
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pean countries in dealing with such problems. We believe
that the "right and wrong" rule, known as the M'Naghten
Rule, which constitutes the sole test of responsibility in England and in the majority of American states, should be abolished. We have cited two case records of patients recently
seen at Bellevue Hospital which clearly point out the flaws in
our laws in handling such problems. We believe that there
should be uniform standards for designation of experts as the
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State
Laws has proposed, and that these experts should be hired and
paid for by the courts, not by interested parties. Finally we
advocate the further education not only of lawyers and judges
but also of psychiatrists. Until these measures are carried out,
we are not doing justice either to the legal profession, the medical profession, or to the public at large whom we are obligated
to serve.
Thus, with our present day knowledge of human nature, we
should try to treat the culprit as an individual, with constant
concern for his own benefit and for social good. In doing so,
we will also contribute to further advancement of our knowledge and help develop a better method of preventing criminality. This achievement - as in any medical treatment should be our main goal.
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